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Modern digitally controlled systems require multiparty au-
thentication and authorization to meet the desired security
requirement. This paper describes the design and develop-
ment of NDN-MPS, an automated solution to support mul-
tiparty signature signing and verification for NDN-enabled
applications. NDN-MPS suggests several changes and exten-
sions to the existing NDN security solutions. First, it intro-
duces a new type of trust schema to support signing and
verification for multiple signers under complex policies such
as threshold schemes. Second, it extends the NDN signature
format to accommodate multisignature schemes such as BLS
signature. Third, it introduces a signature collection protocol
to solicit signatures securely from multiple signers. We fur-
ther evaluate NDN-MPS by assessing its security properties
and measuring its performance.
1 INTRODUCTION
For reasons such as multiparty contractual policies and mit-
igating single points of failure, many real-world systems
require a joint decision-making process where multiple par-
ties are involved. For example, for grid-connected distributed
energy resources (DER) systems, the conventional way of
having single proprietary connections to secure grid as-
sets will no longer be sufficient due to the business model
change [12, 27]. Instead, smart devices like solar inverters
will have multiple parties, including customers, manufac-
turers, grid operators, who need to access and send remote
commands, often over the public Internet.
Recently, Named Data Networking (NDN) [29] started
being explored to provide secure networking support for
DER systems. The diversity and number of stakeholders and
DER service provider business models [12] require a multi-
party trust model with expressive and flexible trust policies.
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While NDN has developed supporting mechanisms to se-
cure producer-consumer communications by using crypto
signature schemes such as RSA and ECDSA, there is no ex-
isting work on multiparty authentication and authorization
support. This paper fills in the gap by designing and imple-
menting a secure, efficient, and usable multiparty signature
solution for NDN-enabled applications.
Supporting multiparty signature requires a different secu-
rity model than that supported by the existing NDN security
solutions [31], which considers only two types of parties: a
consumer (verifier) authenticates its received data generated
by a producer (signer) based on given policies. First, multi-
party signing involves third-party signers in the system who
need to sign data produced by others. Second, the verifier
will need to verify the data’s signatures against the given
set of signers, so a new type of trust schema is needed to
define the set of signers that can jointly make a legitimate
signature. Third, effective and secure coordination among
multiple signers is required to ensure the correctness of the
joint signing process.
Contribution. To fulfill the gap, this paper proposes NDN-
MPS, an NDN-based multisignature signing and verification
toolset. To simplify the orchestration of the signing process
among multiple signers, NDN-MPS makes a design choice of
having a coordinator in each multiparty signing process who
will take the unsigned data as input and carry out the signing
process by collecting required signature pieces from all the
required signers. As such, NDN-MPS provides applications
with the support of coordinators, signers, and verifiers in
multiparty signing scenarios:
(1) A new design of trust schema that supports the seman-
tics for multiparty signing and verification, including
threshold-based policies (e.g., legitimate if signed by any
𝑘 out of 𝑛 signers).
(2) A signature collection protocol for the collection of sig-
natures from multiple signers. The protocol ensures the























Preprint, XXX, XXX Anonymous Authors
confidentiality of the data being signed and the secrecy
of the signing progress.
(3) A new type of key locator scheme to ensure the data
integrity in the multiparty signing process and to accom-
modate multiple signers.
We implement NDN-MPS in C++with amultisignature scheme
called BLS [5]1.
Outline. In the rest of the paper, we first introduce the back-
ground and motivation of our work in §2. We then define the
system model of NDN-based multiparty signing and verifica-
tion in §3, and point out the technical challenges in realizing
this model in NDN. After that, we present the design of NDN-
MPS in §4 and describe the threshold support in §5. We then
assess the security of NDN-MPS in §6, evaluate NDN-MPS
in §7, and discuss a number of design choices and issues in
§8. Finally, we conclude our work in §9.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
2.1 Crypto Support for Multiparty Signing
A conventional method is to collect signatures from individ-
ual signers and present the collection to the verifier. However,
this method not only needs a collection of signatures that
can be large in size, but also requires the verifier to verify
each signature in the collection. Therefore, space and time
complexities grow linearly as the number of signers grows.
A multiparty signature scheme provides an efficient alter-
native, where a collection of signatures can be aggregated
into a single one; the verifier only needs to perform one
verification operation against the public keys of all the sign-
ers. A typical example is BLS signature scheme [4, 5]. BLS
does not require additional negotiation among signers (i.e.,
plain public-key model), and an arbitrary number of BLS
public keys and signatures can be easily aggregated without
knowing the private keys.
2.2 Related Works
While the concept of multiparty signing [8] and different
multisignature schemes [2, 5, 11, 23] have existed for years,
most of the existing works focus on using the multisignature
to combine multiple separate signatures for space and time
efficiency, assuming that signatures have already been col-
lected. In these papers, the joint signature can be viewed as
a compressed collection of individual signatures, but not a
multisignature on the same message. For example, Zhao et al.
suggests aggregating signatures to reduce themessage length
for signing connection path messages in Secure BGP [32].
Maxwell et al. proposes the use of BLS signature in bitcoin or
1NDN-MPS can easily be extended to other non-interactive multisignature
schemes like MSP multisignature [3] and the Bitcoin ECDSA threshold
signature [9, 10].
in general blockchain systems to save space in a block [14].
Multisignature has also been used to optimize the permis-
sioned distributed ledger by combining multiple endorse-
ments from different peers into one [7].
In addition to compressing signatures, multisignatures
have also been recently used in the digital wallet design in
blockchain systems, such as Bitcoin [17] and Ethereum [6],
to increase security by avoiding single points of failure. The
main idea is to split an account secret to store in multiple
entities (e.g. multiple devices owned by users). Any trans-
action from the wallet must be jointly signed by a certain
number of secret holders [9, 10]. However, the trust policies
in these systems are largely static (e.g., 1-of-2 account always
assumes a 1-out-2 policy), and the signature collection pro-
cess is usually application-specific and not automated (e.g.,
copy and paste signature pieces from other devices).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work
that supports application-independent multiparty signing
with an automated signature collection. Leveraging NDN’s
semantically named and secured data concept, our goal is
to provide a systematic solution of multiparty signing in
NDN with usable supporting components like a signature
collection protocol and a flexible trust schema language.
2.3 A New Trust Model Is Needed
The Existing Producer-Consumer Trust Model.
The producer-consumer trust model is adopted by the exist-
ing NDN security support. Under this model, each NDN data
object is assembled, named, and cryptographically signed by
its producer. To help consumers to verify the data, each data
object carries a signature information field to keep the meta
information of the signature; the most important informa-
tion is the key locator, indicating which key should be used
to verify the signature value. A key locator is usually the
name of the verification key so that a consumer can fetch
the corresponding key to verify the received data.
Verifying the signature against a trustworthy public key
only ensures authenticity. To further verify the authorization
of the producer, a trust schema is used to determine whether
the producer is legitimate to produce the named data. NDN’s
semantic naming enables the trust schema to use names to
systematically define the relationship between the signing
key and data object of each step in an acceptable certificate
chain. Trust schema rules for a specific application system
usually contain the following elements: (i) the format or
structure of the data names that the rules apply to, (ii) the
name pattern of the expected signing key name at each step
in the certificate chain, (iii) the acceptable trust anchors that
certificate chains end with. If a signature is generated by a
party whose key name is not allowed for signing such data
or the signer’s identity cannot be certified by an acceptable
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certificate chain to a trusted anchor, the signature will be
rejected.
Importantly, the producer-consumer trust model only as-
sumes two parties, the producer and the consumer, both of
which are directly involved with the data.
The Need for a New Model. In a multiparty signing sce-
nario, the existing trust scheme is insufficient to clearly de-
scribe the policies of the new trust model because (i) there
are multiple signers, (ii) (at least some) signers are not the
producer of the data to be signed; and (iii) multisignature
requires a new party that coordinates the signing, which
the trust schema should clearly define. The current protocol
specification and implementation of NDN libraries also need
enhancement to support multiparty signing. For example,
the current key locator cannot carry sufficient meta infor-
mation of multiple signers, and the trust schema does not
support the signing and verification of multisignatures.
2.4 An Example Scenario
We introduce an example scenario used throughout the pa-
per to ease the reader’s comprehension of various concepts.
Assume an equipment manufacturer requests customers up-
grade an inverter’s firmware to correct a security vulnera-
bility. To make the update, the maintenance operator, Alice,
needs a command, an NDN data object, to be jointly signed
by the following parties: (i) the equipment manufacturer’s
Quality Assurance (QA) department (certifying the upgrade
is of release quality), (ii) the solar site’s operation team (ensur-
ing they know the equipment will be offline for some time),
and (iii) the site’s owner (permitting the possible produc-
tion reduction, if the process cannot be completed promptly).
The equipment that executes the firmware update will verify
the signed data to ensure that it can safely proceed with
the update. We further assume Alice’s NDN name is “/Site
/maintenance/Alice”, the signers’ prefixes are “/Mfr/QA”,
“/Site/operation”, and “/Site/Owner”, respectively. Under
each prefix, there can be multiple entities; for example, under
“/Mfr/QA” there can be “/Mfr/QA/operatorX” and “/Mfr/QA
/operatorY”.
3 MODELS AND CHALLENGES OF NDN
MULTIPARTY SIGNING
The goal of NDN-MPS is to support multiparty signature
signing and verification over NDN.
3.1 System Model
In each multiparty signing process, there are three parties:
• Coordinator. The coordinator is signaled by the data pro-
ducer to generate a multisignature for the data. Based on























Figure 1: Example Scenario
the coordinator will collect signatures from a group of
known signers and then aggregate them into a multiparty
signature. To collect signatures, the coordinator needs to
know signers’ names and certificates.
• Signers. The signers can come from different organiza-
tions and have different trust anchors. If a signer approves
the data to be signed, either through in-band operations
(e.g., database query) or out-of-band operations (e.g., hu-
man decisions), that individual will make a signature piece
for aggregating with other signers’ pieces.
• Verifier. The verifier is called by the data consumer to
verify a multisignature along with the data covered by
the signature. The verification succeeds if the multisig-
nature is valid and if its signers satisfy the application’s
requirements as defined in the trust schema.
It is noteworthy that we separate the above roles based on
functional logic. In practice, one entity can play multiple
roles, e.g., the coordinator can also be one of the signers.
In addition, an entity can play different roles in different
signing processes.
In our example (§2.4), the operator Alice is the producer of
the command and runs the coordinator. The manufacturer’s
QA team, the site’s operation team, and the site owner are the
signers. After being signaled by Alice that the signed com-
mand is ready, the inverter, as the data consumer, will fetch
the data and call the verifier to verify the multisignature.
Assumptions. We assume all three types of entities have
gone through the standard NDN bootstrapping process [31],
through which each entity in the system obtains an identity,
certificate, the system trust anchors, and the trust schema.
Note that all the signers’ key types should be compatible with
NDN-MPS, e.g., BLS key type with the current NDN-MPS
implementation. Therefore, signers can authenticate coor-
dinators, and verifiers can authenticate signers. As stated,
we also assume the coordinator’s awareness of the signers
from which the coordinator can select appropriate signers to
3
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generate legitimate signatures. In addition, there is a known
attack against the BLS signature, called rogue key attack [4],
where a malicious coordinator may successfully generate a
legitimate multisignature without obtaining real signature
pieces from the signers. To prevent such types of attacks, as
suggested by [4], we assume that each signer’s certificate
carries a piece of cryptographic information, called a proof
of possession, to prove the possession for the public key
corresponding to secret key.
3.2 The Signing and Verification Procedure
Under the system model, a complete signing and verification
process can be described as follows in an abstract way.
(1) The coordinator starts by deciding the signer list based
on the trust schema and proceeds through the signing
process by contacting individual signers.
(2) Each signer verifies the request against the trust schema
to ensure that the coordinator is legitimate.
(3) If the signer is permitted by the application logic to sign
the data, it generates the signature and sends it to the
coordinator.
(4) The coordinator aggregates the collected signature pieces
into one and appends it to the unsigned data to get the
finalized signed data object.
(5) After the consumer application obtains the signed data,
the verifier verifies the signed data against the trust
schema.
The coordinator is triggered to start the process by certain
application events. For example, the maintenance operator
Alice can start the coordinator when receiving a firmware
update notification from the manufacturer. Similarly, obtain-
ing the signed packet is also realized at the application layer.
In the same example, the inverter can call the verifier when
receiving the firmware update command.
To ensure the security of the system, the following poli-
cies should be explicitly and rigorously defined by the trust
schema.
• Coordinator Verification Trust Schema(Section 3.3).
In step 2, the trust schema needs to define the coordina-
tor based on the names or name patterns of legitimate
coordinators.
• Multisignature Trust Schema(Section 3.4). In step 5,
the trust schema needs to specify how many and which
signers can generate a legitimate signature for a given
named data.
In step 3, whether a signer will agree to the sign data
depends on two factors. First, each signer should ensure
the data is allowed to be signed by her according to the
installedmultisignature trust schema. Second, the signermay
also need approval from the application logic, e.g., through
some database query or even human decision making; this
process is application-specific and thus omitted in this paper.
Importantly, depending on application scenarios, the time
duration of this step may vary significantly. In the example in
Section 2.4, to ensure the power supply after shutting down
the inverters for the update, the public utility may need to
measure the remaining power supplies against the power
demand in the area before agreeing to sign the command.
3.3 Coordinator Verification Trust Schema
The coordinator verification schema is to verify the identity
and authorization of the coordinator when receiving a sig-
nature request. Such a request carries a regular signature
generated by the coordinator, and thus this trust schema can
be expressed using the existing trust schema languages or
tools [18, 26]. In our example (§2.4), the trust schema can
define only maintenance operators, who are under the prefix
of “/Site/maintenance” and derived from the anchor cer-
tificate “/Site/maintenance/KEY/123”, can be coordinators
sending signature collection requests. The pseudo-code of





3.4 Multisignature Trust Schema
The multisignature trust schema requires additional seman-
tics for legitimacy verification of multiple signers for a sig-
nature. In particular, a multisignature trust schema should
contain three pieces of information.
• Data Profile. A profile specifies which data the policy
should be applied to. This profile is usually the name or
the name pattern of the data.
• Legitimate Signer List. A legitimate signer list specifies
all the signers required to make a legitimate signature for
the given data. This list can be effectively expressed by a
list of the signers’ name patterns.
• Known Signers. As stated, our model assumes that the
coordinator knows the signers in the system. One imple-
mentation option is to include all signer information, in-
cluding a routable prefix and the certificate for each signer,
as part of the multisignature trust schema. The known
signers can also be imported signers as a table or obtained
from trust anchors.
In the example described in §2.4, the data profile should
match the name of the firmware update command data, the
legitimate signers are the prefixes of three required parties,
and the known signers are all the candidate signers in the
system. The pseudo-code of such a trust schema policy is in
Section 4.2.
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In §5, we further extend the syntax of multisignature to
support threshold-based policy. For example, a threshold-
based policy can express the legitimate signers as any 𝑘 out
of 𝑛 candidate signers.
3.5 Technical Challenges
Signature Coverage in Multiparty Signing. To be aggre-
gated correctly, each signer’s signature should cover iden-
tical data. However, by the current design of the signing
process, at the time of signature generation, the signer will
customize the signature information file of the data packet by
writing the signing key name into the key locator field. Con-
sequently, each signer will sign the data with customized sig-
nature information, thus leading to inconsistent data signed
by different signers and a broken final signature after an
aggregation.
One potential solution is to let the coordinator hardcode
the signature information, and each signer generates a signa-
ture without modifying the signature information. However,
this solution is insufficient because the coordinator does
not know the final signer list before contacting the signers.
For example, to meet the requirement of a signer under the
prefix “/Mfr/QA”, the coordinator Alice decides to contact
“/Mfr/QA/operatorX” and thus hardcode this name into the
key locator field. However, operator X may be offline, and
thus Alice needs to find an alternative signer, say “/Mfr/QA
/operatorY”. As such, Alice needs to change the signature
information halfway through the signature collection.
As described in §4, in NDN-MPS, we propose using a late-
binding key locator to address this challenge.
Threshold Signature. Threshold signature scheme [11] is
a type of multiparty signature, which supports a flexible
access structure: instead of explicitly defining the signer
combinations for a legal signature, 𝑘 arbitrary signers out
of a signer set of size 𝑛 can jointly generate a legal signa-
ture. A common approach to support the threshold scheme
is to directly utilize threshold signature schemes. For exam-
ple, a typical construction of threshold signature schemes
is to combine traditional signature schemes with Linear Se-
cret Sharing [21]. However, this solution suffers from a few
disadvantages. First, to bootstrap the system, either (i) a cen-
tralized trusted dealer is needed for key distribution or (ii)
the signers need to exchange a large number of messages for
setting up their keys in a distributed manner. In addition, the
key maintenance is complicated because when a key is com-
promised, or when there is a new signer, it may require a new
bootstrapping process where all signers must be online and
update their keys. Lastly, the key aggregation is relatively
slow, which takes 𝑂 (𝑘2) traditionally and 𝑂 (𝑘 log𝑘) [28] to



































Figure 2: An Overview of NDN-MPS
As described in §5, NDN-MPS takes a system approach
with the multisignature trust schema, bypassing the afore-
mentioned issues.
4 DESIGN OF NDN-MPS
Wedescribe the design of NDN-MPS by first giving an overview
and then introducing eachmain component of the NDN-MPS.
This section focuses on how to support multiparty signing
and verification when the legitimate signers or their name
patterns are specified. We present the threshold signature
support in §5.
4.1 An Overview
NDN-MPS is designed as a security support toolset for ap-
plications. NDN-MPS consists of three main components
(Figure 2). First, a new type of trust schema that allows ap-
plications to express the signing and verification policies
of multisignatures. Second, an extension of the key locator
in NDN data objects to keep the to-be-signed data consis-
tent across signers and allow complex signature information.
Third, a signature collection protocol for the coordinator to
collect signatures from multiple signers.
These three components are used in the process of mul-
tisignature signing and verification.
Signature Collection. The coordinator starts the signing
process when the application provides the unsigned data and
the multisignature trust schema (Section 3.4) through a local
API call. From the trust schema, the coordinator identifies a
list of signers and then starts the signature collection. In a
nutshell, the coordinator issues a signed request to the signer
and presents the unsigned data as the request parameter.
To ensure the consistency of the data to be signed among
signers, the coordinator will fill the key locator field with
a placeholder name called late-binding key locator (Section
4.3). Such a placeholder is the key to make the data to be
signed deterministic and consistent across multiple signers.
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Upon receiving the request, each signer will first verify it
against the coordinator verification trust schema to ensure
that its sender is a legitimate coordinator. After that, the
signer can decide on whether to sign the data or not. In this
process, besides checking against knownmultisignature trust
schema policies, the signer may also need to go through some
application-specific procedures. If the signer’s application
agrees to sign the data, it will generate the signature over the
data, without modifying the key locator or any other fields.
In an unstable network or in an attack, signers may be
forced offline, unable to be reached by the coordinator. In this
case, the coordinator can try to reach an alternative signer
permitted by the trust schema, e.g., the coordinator Alice can
try “/Mfr/QA/operatorY” when “/Mfr/QA/operatorX” is un-
available. This design provides a certain degree of resiliency
that even if some signer fails, the signing can continue. Im-
portantly, the change of signers will not affect the value of
the late-binding key locator name as it is a placeholder, so
the consistency of the data being signed among signers is
preserved.
Signature Aggregation. After collecting sufficient signa-
ture pieces, the coordinator aggregates them to generate a
single signature and attach it to the original unsigned data.
In addition, the coordinator generates another Data packet,
called a SigInfo packet, to carry carries the signer informa-
tion, i.e., signers’ key names. Importantly, SigInfo is named
with the placeholder key locator name. As such, a SigInfo
packet can be linked from the signed data’s key locator, over-
coming the limitation of the existing key locator design,
which does not support multiple signers.
Signature Verification. To verify a piece of multiparty
signed data, the verifier first needs to obtain both the signed
data, which is expected to be integrated with specific applica-
tions. The SigInfo packet can then be fetched with an Interest
carrying the key locator name specified in the signed data.
After that, the verifier first checks the signer list from the
SigInfo packet against the multisignature trust schema to
ensure the signers are legitimate to sign such a piece of data.
Finally, the verifier validates the multisignature using the
public keys of the signers.
4.2 Multisignature Trust Schema
As the baseline, the trust schema allows specifying multi-
ple required signers. For example, a signature is valid only
when required signers 𝑅1 to 𝑅𝑛 are present. With our trust
schema syntax, the key name of 𝑅1 to 𝑅𝑛 will be listed under
a configuration field called “all-of”.
Furthermore, to enjoy the flexibility of structural names,
the trust schema should allow name patterns. For this pur-
pose, the multiparty trust schema supports wildcard char-
acter ∗, which can match any name component. Using the
example described in §2.4, the wildcard character in “/Mfr
/QA/*/KEY/*” allows any operator under the equipment man-
ufacturer’s QA team to participate in the joint signing.
The pseudo-code of a multisignature trust schema for
the example use case is shown below. The rule applies to
the command to update the solar inverter firmware. The
known signers should be the registered operators under each






4.3 Late-binding Key Locator Name
At the beginning of a signing process, the coordinator does
not know the exact final signers out of the eligible list, be-
cause some signers may be unavailable. Therefore, the co-
ordinator may have to change the signer list in the middle
of the signing process. However, before a signer generates
a signature piece, the signature information, including the
key locator, needs to be deterministic and consistent among
all signers so that signature pieces can be aggregated.
Therefore, NDN-MPS lets the coordinator place a place-
holder Data packet name as the key locator. This name is
late-binding because, at the time of the signature collection
phase, there is no Data packet bound to this name. After com-
pleting the signing process, the SigInfo packet containing
the signature information will be available under that name
to specify the exact signers of this signature packet. This
packet typically contains the list of the signer’s key names;
hints such as the trust schema name or the aggregated public
key can also be included. The SigInfo packet can be signed
by the coordinator for data integrity. Since the exchange of
signed data eventually occurs between the coordinator and
the verifier at the application layer, the verifier will have
the means to authenticate the coordinator and the SigInfo
packet.
When verifying an aggregated signature, the verifier will
also need the SigInfo packet. The SigInfo packet can be
fetched by the verifier with an Interest carrying the key
locator name. With the signer information from the SigInfo
packet, the verifier can aggregate the signers’ public keys
accordingly and verify the signature value.
4.4 NDN-MPS Remote Procedure Call
An important component of multiparty signature support is a
protocol to request and collect signature pieces from signers.
This interaction can be considered as a remote procedure
call (RPC) where the coordinator is the caller and where the
6
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* (if not yet ready) milliseconds for result fetch
* (if not yet ready) result name: /repo/MPS/result/randomness/v1
Figure 3: Remote procedure call in NDN-MPS
signer is the executor. The RPC protocol used in NDN-MPS
is based on NSC but provides stronger security and privacy.
Security Targets.We want to provide authenticity and in-
tegrity of the process to prevent attackers from hindering
the signing process or voiding the signature by inserting un-
expected signature pieces. Furthermore, the confidentiality
of the process is also important, considering attackers may
increase their advantages by obtaining useful information be-
fore the signed data is finalized. In addition, potential record-
and-replay attacks and denial-of-service attacks should be
considered as well. We assess the security of NDN-MPS’s
RPC in §6.
Related Works. A straightforward solution is to directly
apply existing NDN-based RPC protocols between the co-
ordinator and each signer, for example, RICE [13], the RPC
used in DNMP [18], and Named Service Call (NSC) [15].
However, while RICE provides sufficient security and pri-
vacy protection, it requires modification of the underlying
NDN forwarding pipeline. DNMP RPC requires an NDN syn-
chronization protocol which is excessive for our use case. In
comparison, NSC is lightweight and requires no modification
of the NDN forwarding, but it does not provide payload en-
cryption and result confidentiality as needed by NDN-MPS.
Therefore, in this work, we extend the design of NSC to fit
our needs.
NDN-MPS RPC. We design the NDN-MPS RPC for signa-
ture collection based on NSC but provides stronger security
and privacy. The main design choice made by NDN-MPS’s
RPC is the following.
• Using signed Interest and Data exchange for authenticity
and integrity. Coordinator trust schema is also applied
when signers verify the RPC request from coordinators.
• Applying Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement to negotiate
a per-RPC shared secret for packet payload encryption. As
such, all the sensitive information exchanged in the RPC
is encrypted for privacy protection.
• Wrapping the parameter and the result of RPC into a Data
packet whose name suffix is randomly generated and con-
tent is encrypted, as shown in Figure 3.
Through this design, attackers cannot know what data is
signed in the signature collection and have no idea about the
result of each RPC, which satisfies one of the main design
goals of NDN-MPS.
As shown in Figure 3, to start the signing process, the
coordinator expresses a signed request Interest to the signer.
This Interest carries a name, called 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 , pointing to a
parameter Data packet carrying the unsigned data. At this
time, the parameter Data packet is not generated yet. Such
a name comprises the coordinator’s prefix and a randomly
generated component, revealing no information about the
unsigned packet. If the coordinator’s prefix is routable, to
make the parameter Data packet available, a forwarding hint
to the packet should be carried by the request as well. In
addition, the Interest also carries DH public parameters.
On receiving the request Interest, the signer will first ver-
ify the signature to ensure the coordinator is a legitimate
party according to the coordinator verification trust schema
defined by the system. Then, the signer will also generate
a pair of public and private keys for DH and derive a mes-
sage authentication code key 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑐 and a symmetric encryp-
tion key 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 from the DH (key derivation function is used
along with DH for better security). After that, the signer will
generate an acknowledgment Data packet containing the
following information. (i) A status code indicating whether
the request is accepted. Since the signer has not seen the
data to be signed, the status solely relies on the coordinator
identity verification result. (ii) The estimated time for the
RPC result to be available. (iii) The name of the result Data
packet, called 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 . This name is supposed to be ran-
dom and unrelated to the signer. For this purpose, the final
result Data can be published to a third-party repository, and
a forwarding hint to that repository can be added to the ac-
knowledgment Data as well. Importantly, these parameters
are encrypted with the 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 . In addition, the acknowledg-
ment Data also contains the signer’s public parameters in
plaintext for DH. This acknowledgment packet is signed by
the signer’s private key.
After replying with the acknowledgment, the signer can
immediately issue an Interest to fetch the parameter.
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Upon receiving the acknowledgment packet, the coordi-
nator verifies the signature, calculates the same 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑐 and
𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 from DH with the coordinator’s public key, and de-
crypts the payload carried in the Data content. Then, the
coordinator will finalize the parameter packet by naming
it as 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 , encrypting the unsigned packet with 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐
into the content field of the Data, and signing it with 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑐 .
This parameter packet will be fetched by the signer’s Interest
packet. After knowing the 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 and time for fetching
the result from the acknowledgment packet, the coordinator
can schedule a data fetch accordingly.
On the signer side, after fetching the parameter packet, if
the signer agrees to sign the packet, the signer will generate
a signature over the unsigned packet. During the signing
process, the signer will not modify any field, including the
signature information field, of the unsigned packet. Then the
signer will encrypt the signature value with 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐 and wrap
the ciphertext into a Data packet named as 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 and
signed with 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑐 .
5 SUPPORT OF THRESHOLD
NDN-MPS provides the function of threshold signature by a
system means with the multisignature trust schema. This de-
parts from the conventional solution of applying additional
cryptographic tools (e.g., linear secret sharing [21]) to ex-
isting signature schemes. As stated in §3.5, this is because
the cryptographic solution suffers from several drawbacks
including high maintenance overhead and low efficiency.
Specifically, we let multisignature trust schema support
threshold verification policy by adding two new field called
“at-least-num” and “from”. To express the policy that a sig-
nature is valid when 𝑘 out of𝑚 signers are present, the 𝑘
will be specified by the “at-least-num” and the key names of
𝑚 signers are listed after the “from”. We show an example
of multisignature trust schema with threshold verification
below. Different from the required signers as described in
§2.4, it only needs any two of the three parties to generate
a legitimate signature. Note that these two fields can also
be used together with existing multisignature fields to sup-
port more complex policy, e.g., a signature needs 𝑛 requires






Comparedwith cryptographic solutions of threshold scheme,
NDN-MPS does not need any centralized trusted dealer, and
the key maintenance is much simpler. To be more specific,
the key setup does not require interactive operations and
can be done individually per signer with the public parame-
ters. In addition, the keys can be managed individually. For
example, a signer’s key can be renewed or revoked without
bothering other signers’ keys.
6 SECURITY ASSESSMENT
We start the security analysis of NDN-MPS against the de-
sired properties as stated in §4.4 Then, we consider several
attacks potentially conducted by attackers.
Multiparty Authentication. The verifier can authenticate
the signers of the aggregate signature and judge whether the
signature is legitimate by the features of the underlying BLS
signature and the multisignature trust schema. The signature
verification will guarantee the following:
• The signers are qualified to generate a legitimate signature
required by the multisignature trust schema.
• The signature value can be verified by public keys of
claimed signers. This protection is ensured by the BLS
signature that can only be verified with corresponding
signers’ keys.
• The data content is not altered. If data has changed after
the signature pieces are created, the BLS signature will no
longer be valid for the altered data.
If signature verification succeeds, this ensures the authenti-
cation of all involved signers.
Coordinator and Signer Authentication. In NDN-MPS,
any signer can verify the identity of the coordinator by veri-
fying the signature carried by the RPC request Interest. Sim-
ilarly, the coordinator can verify the signer’s identity by
validating the signature of the acknowledgment Data packet.
The derived secrets from DH protects subsequent data ex-
change.
Confidentiality of the Signature Collection.We analyze
the confidentiality of the RPC protocol used in NDN-MPS
against eavesdroppers. Specifically, we assume the eaves-
dropper can observe the Interest and Data packets exchanged
between the coordinator and signers. Among them, the po-
tentially useful information includes (i) packet names, (ii) key
locator names, and (iii) the application parameters carried in
the initial RPC request Interest. The rest of the information
is either protected by the encryption or does not leak use-
ful information to the attacker (e.g., public DH parameters,
signature values). Here we iterate the revealed information
from these sources.
• Name of the RPC request (and acknowledgment): The
name contains the prefix of the signer and coordinator,
thus revealing their identities. Since the prefix is used for
forwarding, it is inevitable unless additional infrastruc-
tures are used, e.g. NDN-based VPN or onion routing. The
rest of the name components are either statically defined
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by the protocol or generated from the hash function of
the payload, revealing no further information than the
payload itself.
• Name of the RPC parameter request (and reply): Similarly,
the only known information to the attacker is that the
signer sends a request for the parameter; the rest of the
name components are meaningless.
• Name of the RPC result fetch request (and reply): Since the
packet name is generated irrelevantly to previous packets
and cannot be predicted by the attacker, the unlinkability
holds if there exists a sufficient anonymity set2. That is,
the attacker cannot recognize whether an Interest is for
result fetching or not, so it cannot infer the RPC result.
• Application parameters in the RPC request Interest: The
parameter packet name and DH parameters are included in
the request Interest packet, but they do not leak useful in-
formation to the attacker; by knowing the parameter name,
the attacker can only know whether the signer fetches the
parameter, but cannot know if the signer will agree to sign
the data or not. The rest of the parameter, namely the DH
parameters, can be considered random bits and thus makes
no sense to the attacker.
• Key locators: In the exchange of the RPC request, key
locators can reveal the identity of the signer and the co-
ordinator, but as stated, they are already revealed by the
names for forwarding purposes. The rest of the key loca-
tors are used for HMAC, which is random and thus reveals
no information about the packet signer.
Therefore, by observing the public information carried
in the packets of RPC, an attacker cannot track the result
of the signature collection process. The key enabler is the
unlinkability between an RPC and its result fetching process.
Resistance to Record-and-replay Attack. We consider a
threat where an eavesdropper may record the signed RPC
request Interest sent by the coordinator and attack a signer
by replaying this Interest. Such an attack can be effectively
prevented by adding a timestamp and nonce into the Interest
packet signature. At the signer side, the signer can verify the
timestamp of each incoming RPC request Interest against
a predefined grace period. In addition, the signer can keep
a small state, say a bloom filter [1], of the nonce values
seen from the recent legal requests. In this way, the attacker
cannot replay because there is no Interest packet whose
timestamp is before the current time by the grace period and
whose nonce has not been seen by the signer.
2A insufficient anonymity set results in easy compromise of the privacy.
For example, if the coordinator only has contacted one signer in a given
time period, it is easy to link a later Interest to the result fetch Interest. We
acknowledge this assumption is vague and not quantitative, but this is a
general open issue for many privacy-enhancement systems.
Resistance to Denial-of-service Attack.An attacker may
try to deny the service of a signer by flooding RPC request
Interests. In general, the request Interest is signed and in-
dicates the DH key generation, which consumes a certain
amount of computation at the sender side. In addition, these
Interests cannot be copied from a recorded valid request, as
stated before. These facts can discourage the attack.
However, the attacker may forge a large number of re-
quest Interests that are correct in the format but contain
incorrect signature values or DH key bits. Note that this is
not a specific problem for NDN-MPS but a general issue for
many protocols, including TLS. In NDN, such attacks can be
mitigated by the DDoS defense mechanisms like FITT [30].
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have implemented NDN-MPS into an open-source li-
brary 3 in C++. Our library depends on ndn-cxx [24] and a
BLS library [22] that has been fully examined and is com-
patible with the BLS API specification defined by Ethereum
2.0 [19]. The multisignature trust schema is implemented
in the library as a trust schema configuration file parser. To
support more complicated use cases where multiple legiti-
mate signer sets are valid, one can simply create multiple
trust schema files applying to the same data prefix. In the sig-
nature verification process, the signature is accepted if there
is at least one trust schema rule that is satisfied. The known
signers are implemented with a separate configuration file
that contains a list of NDN certificates.
In the rest of the section, we report the evaluation of our
C++ implementation of NDN-MPS. Our evaluation result
shows that (i) NDN-MPS requires low-memory and low-
network overhead to support multiparty signature signing,
collection, and verification, (ii) the cryptographic operations
introduced by using NDN-MPS is efficient and practical, and
(iii) NDN-MPS is resilient to unavailable signers.
Bandwidth andNetworkOverhead.ABLS signature piece
from a single signer and an aggregate signature is of the same
size. With BLS12-381 elliptic curve [20] (providing about 128
bits of security), the BLS signature size is 96 bytes, which
is slightly larger than an ECDSA signature (about 72 bytes)
and much smaller than an RSA signature (256 bytes) while
providing similar bits of security. Regarding the size of public
key certificates, a BLS public key over BLS12-381 is only 48
bytes, which is much smaller than public keys in ECDSA and
RSA that provide a similar level of security.
The RPC in NDN-MPS requires two(2) round trip times
(RTTs) when the signer is available. Therefore, if the signer
is unavailable, the coordinator will notice it after the timeout
of the first Interest.
3The codebase repository URL will be included with the final version of the
paper
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(b) Different data Size
Figure 4: Scalability to Signer Number and data Size
NDN data Signing/Verification Overhead. We compare
the NDN data signing and verification performance of BLS
multisignature with conventional public key signatures, in-
cluding ECDSA (on elliptic curve secp256r1) and RSA (with
2048 bits key). ECDSA and RSA signatures are realized by
ndn-cxx’s keychain with OpenSSL. The content of the data
to be signed is 16 bytes of random data.
Operation BLS ECDSA RSA
Signing 1.38ms 0.15ms 1.58ms
Verification 4.32ms 0.43ms 0.14ms
As shown, although slower than ECDSA and RSA (OpenSSL
has specialized hardware and software optimization), the
performance of BLS signature in NDN is still acceptable for
practical use.
Scalability to Signer Number and Data Size. We also
evaluate the scalability of NDN-MPS by increasing the num-
ber of signers needed for the signature generation and the
size of data to be signed. As shown in Figure 4a, only aggre-
gation time is linearly affected by the signer number while
the signing and verification time stays almost constant. As
reported in Figure 4b, when increasing the data size with two
signers, the time of signing, aggregation, and verification
stay mostly constant.
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Data Object To Be Signed
NDN-MPS helps to sign a data object which can mainly be
in two different forms. If the data object can fit into a single
NDN Data packet 4, it can be directly embedded in the RPC
parameter packet. A data object can also be larger than the
NDN maximum packet size. In this case, the object cannot
be directly embedded into one RPC parameter packet, e.g., a
large file or stream data. Instead, it needs to be segmented
into multiple packets. To avoid multiple signers from signing
4A data object can also be an Interest packet, then the result will be a signed
Interest [25].
each segment, we can introduce a manifest Data packet [16],
which contains the hash values of all segments in the form
of a Merkle Tree and their names. Then, only the manifest
Data needs to be embedded in the RPC parameter packet
and signed by multiple parties.
8.2 Design Discussion of NDN-MPS RPC
We discuss some of the design alternatives in NDN-MPS RPC
and explain why these alternatives were not adopted.
Which packet should carry the parameters? In NDN-
MPS, the initial request Interest to the signer contains the
name of the unsigned data instead of the data itself for the
following reasons. First, in the initial request Interest packet,
the coordinator has not finished the Diffie-Hellman exchange
and thus does not know how to encrypt the unsigned data.
Second, directly carrying the unsigned data does not scale
well when the data is large.
How to fetch the result? NDN-MPS uses separate Interest
packets for the request and the result. An alternative design
would be to let the signer directly reply with the RPC result
to the request Interest (i.e., the first Interest packet sent by
the coordinator in the RPC). However, this does not work
when the signer’s processing time is longer than the Interest
timeout. Given that the coordinator needs to determine the
signer’s availability quickly, the coordinator cannot set the
timeout of the request Interest to be too long.
How to publish the result? In NDN-MPS, the RPC result is
encapsulated in a result Data packet. An alternative method
would be to directly publish the signed data as a Data packet
for fetching; however, this design may result in several is-
sues. For one, this approach may result in cache poisoning
because the result Data packet shares the same name as the
Data packet carrying the aggregate signature. Additionally,
directly publishing the result data can reveal the signed con-
tent and disclose that the signer has signed the data, which
can break the confidentiality of the signing process. Even
though the data content can be encrypted, the data name
still cannot be hidden for the data retrieval purpose.
9 CONCLUSION
NDN-MPS is an application-independentmultisignature toolset
designed to support and automate multiparty signature sign-
ing, collection, and verification. Through our work, we show
how NDN-MPS leverages existing NDN features to support
more complex trust models than the conventional producer-
consumer model. On the other hand, the security support
of today’s TCP/IP network, e.g., the TLS, is limited to the
point-to-point trust model. Thus, new security models or
cryptographic tools such as multisignature are mainly sup-
ported at the application layer, separate and orthogonal to
10
Supporting Multiparty Signing over Named Data Networking Preprint, XXX, XXX
the overall network security architecture. In contrast, NDN’s
data-centric security based on application layer semantic
naming enables a coherent overall system security frame-
work, which poses no limitations to new trust models. It
provides a simple yet graceful platform to explore new se-
curity models and tools with coherent network application
support.
In our future work, we will continue to exercise NDN-
MPS in the DER scenarios. In addition, we will also look
into and understand new security use cases and develop new
solutions for NDN security support.
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